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INDEPENDENT CRIME LABORATORIES:
THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATIONAL AND COGNITIVE BIAS
Paul C. Giannelli*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial recommendations in the National Academy
of Sciences’ report on forensic science, Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward (NAS Report),1 concerns the removal of crime
laboratories from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies.2
According to the NAS Report:
The best science is conducted in a scientific setting as opposed to a
law enforcement setting. Because forensic scientists often are driven
in their work by a need to answer a particular question related to the
issues of a particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice
appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency.3
For decades, scholars have commented on the “inbred bias of crime
laboratories affiliated with law enforcement agencies”4—as have courts,5
*
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1
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009)
[hereinafter NAS REPORT]. The report’s recommendation for an independent federal
entity, the National Institute of Forensic Science, is also controversial. Id. at 19–20
(Recommendation 1).
2
Id. at 24 (Recommendation 4). The report also states: “Scientific and medical
assessment conducted in forensic investigations should be independent of law
enforcement efforts either to prosecute criminal suspects or even to determine whether
a criminal act has indeed been committed. Administratively, this means that forensic
scientists should function independently of law enforcement administrators.” Id. at 23.
3
Id. at 23–24.
4
James E. Starrs, The Seamy Side of Forensic Science: The Mephitic Stain of
Fred Salem Zain, 17 SCI. SLEUTHING REV. 1, 8 (1993); see also Paul C. Giannelli, The
Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime
Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 441 (1997) (“Too many experts in the
criminal justice system manifest a police-prosecution bias, a willingness to shade or
distort opinions to support the state’s case.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science:
The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 160 (1991) (“Another [problem]
is the failure of forensic scientists to shield themselves from possible bias.”); Andre A.
Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1993) (stating crime labs “may be so imbued with a
pro-police bias that they are willing to circumvent true scientific investigation methods
for the sake of ‘making their point.’”); James E. Starrs, The Ethical Obligations of the
Forensic Scientist in the Criminal Justice System, 54 J. ASS’N OFFICIAL ANALYTICAL
CHEMISTS 906, 910 (1971) (noting that lab personnel “inevitably become part of the
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legislators,6 prosecutors,7 investigators,8 and reporters.9 The NAS Report is not
the first to acknowledge the problem of bias. The National Academy of
Sciences’ 1996 DNA Report observed that “[l]aboratory procedures should be
designed with safeguards to detect bias and to identify cases of true
ambiguity.”10 Similarly, the ABA Standards on DNA Evidence contain a
provision on bias.11
The problem of bias in crime laboratories is not unique to the United
States. According to a British court:
Forensic scientists may become partisan. The very fact that the police
seek their assistance may create a relationship between the police and
the forensic scientists. And the adversarial character of the
proceedings tends to promote this process. Forensic scientists
employed by the government may come to see their function as
helping the police.12
effort to bring an offender to justice. And as a result, their impartiality is replaced by a
viewpoint colored brightly with prosecutorial bias.”); Symposium on Science and the
Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 642 (1983) (statement of Professor Joseph
L. Peterson) (noting the factors that “raise a legitimate issue regarding the objectivity
of laboratory personnel”).
5
See R v. Ward, [1993] 96 Crim. App. 1, 68 (U.K.) (“Forensic scientists may
become partisan.”).
6
See Rodney Ellis, Editorial, Want Tough on Crime? Start by Fixing HPD Lab.,
HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2004 (“When crime labs are operating within a police
department, examiner bias can undermine the integrity of scientific results.”). Ellis was
a Texas state senator at the time he wrote the editorial. See id.
7
See Scott Bales, Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, 26 LITIG.
51, 55 (2000) (“But whether nefarious or innocent, too close a connection between
scientists and the law enforcement officers with whom they work creates a real danger
of biased testimony.”). As an assistant U.S. attorney, Justice Bales served on the team
that produced the 1997 I.G. Report on the FBI lab. See infra text accompanying notes
38–39. He is now a justice on the Arizona Supreme Court.
8
See M.A. Thomson, Bias and Quality Control in Forensic Science: A Cause
for Concern, 19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 504, 509–10 (1974) (“Is the witness who has his job
and salary controlled by the State completely free from pressure, conscious or
unconscious, to be entirely impartial?”). Captain Thomson was an Air Force
investigator at the time he wrote this article. See id. at 504 n.1.
9
See Steve Mills et al., When Labs Falter, Defendants Pay: Bias Toward
Prosecution Cited in Illinois Cases, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2004, at 1; Ruth Teichroeb,
Crime Labs Too Beholden to Prosecutors, Critics Say, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
July 23, 2004, at A13.
10
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE 85 (1996). The report adds: “Bias in forensic science usually leads to sins of
omission rather than commission. Possibly exculpating evidence might be ignored or
rejected.” Id. at 84–85.
11
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
DNA EVIDENCE 67 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ABA DNA STANDARDS] (“Cognitive
bias (e.g., observer effects) occurs because people tend to see what they expect to see,
and this typically affects their decision in cases of ambiguity.”), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/dnaevidence.pdf.
12
R v. Ward, [1993] 96 Crim. App. 1, 68 (U.K.).
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One commentator concluded that the miscarriages of justice in Britain
constituted “unequivocal evidence that the pro-prosecution orientation of
government scientists . . . had not adequately been countered in England.”13
Some commentators have proposed independent laboratories as the
remedy for this problem,14 and in 2002, the Illinois Governor’s Commission on
Capital Punishment proposed the establishment of an independent state crime
laboratory.15 The Commission majority believed that “the overall quality of
forensic services would be improved if the laboratory personnel were truly
independent.”16 In contrast, the Department of Justice17 and the National
District Attorneys Association oppose the NAS recommendation of
independent laboratories.18
This Essay examines the issue of independent crime laboratories. Part I
documents the problems that triggered the NAS Report’s recommendation,
while Part II explores the counterarguments. Part III examines the NAS

13
Ian Freckelton, Science and the Legal Culture, 2 EXPERT EVID. 107, 112
(1993); see also David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 171 (1996) (“Many reformers in the United
Kingdom believe that a large percentage of the problems that have arisen in the
forensic science context are attributable to the fact that English forensic science is
almost solely the province of the state.”); Paul Roberts, Forensic Science Evidence
After Runciman, 1994 CRIM. L. REV. 780, 784 (commenting that “forensic scientists
who run with the hounds cannot be expected to give a savaged fox the kiss of life”)
(citing Russell Stockdale, Running with the Hounds, NEW L.J. 772 (June 7, 1991)).
14
See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION,
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 257 (2000) (stating
laboratories should “function as an independent third force within the criminal justice
system”); Giannelli, supra note 4, at 457–62 (arguing for labs associated with a
medical examiner system); see also Ellis, supra note 6 (stating “crime labs should
operate as a separate and independent third party force in the criminal justice system”).
15
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 52
(2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/
chapter_03.pdf [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMM.] (“An independent state
forensic laboratory should be created, operated by civilian personnel, with its own
budget, separate from any police agency or supervision.”). The proposal was never
adopted.
16
Id.
17
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Acting Dir.,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives) (“DOJ also questions whether
full independence of laboratories from law enforcement is advisable or feasible. . . . To
be separated completely from interaction with investigative partners would likely cause
missteps in decision-making that could result in either loss and/or destruction of
evidence, or important analyses left undone.”).
18
National District Attorneys Association, NDAA Comments Provided to the
Consortium of Forensic Sciences Regarding the National Academy of Sciences Report
[hereinafter NDAA Statement] (“NDAA does not believe, as some have suggested,
that all forensic labs must be ‘independent,’ that is, housed outside of a law
enforcement or prosecution agency.”).
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proposal as well as an alternative approach. Part IV sets forth additional
measures that should protect forensic analyses from improper influence.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. Organizational Structure
Crime laboratories are “the oldest and strongest link between science and
technology and criminal justice.”19 In the United States, crime laboratories
developed in the 1920s as an adjunct of police departments.20 A survey of
approximately three hundred crime laboratories revealed that “[s]eventy-nine
percent of all laboratories responding . . . are located within law enforcement/
public safety agencies”21 and “[f]ifty-seven percent . . . would only examine
evidence submitted by law enforcement officials.”22 Thus, it is not surprising
that police norms would influence the laboratory culture. As one scholar
observed: “[T]he police agency controls the formal and informal system of
rewards and sanctions for the laboratory examiners.”23
B. Types of Bias
Commentators have identified both motivational and cognitive bias as a
concern in the forensic setting.24 These classifications are not mutually
exclusive, and cognitive bias comes in several forms.25

19

PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967).
20
See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC
SCIENCE 6 (5th ed. 1995) (“The oldest forensic laboratory in the United States is that of
the Los Angeles Police Department, created in 1923 by August Vollmer, a police chief
from Berkeley, California.”); John I. Thornton, Criminalistics—Past, Present and
Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA 1, 23 (1975) (“In 1923, Vollmer served as Chief of Police
of the City of Los Angeles for a period of one year. During that time, a crime
laboratory was established at his direction.”); see also Bales, supra note 7, at 55 (“The
tie between crime labs and law enforcement agencies is not inevitable. In part, it is a
product of history: rudimentary crime labs were first established near the turn of the
century by law enforcement agencies when officials began to recognize the possible
application of science to criminal investigations. Since that time, the relationship
between labs and law enforcement has flourished because of practical benefits—for
example, streamlining tasks such as close and timely communication, the transfer of
evidence, and record-keeping.”).
21
Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nations’
Criminalistic Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985).
22
Id. at 13.
23
Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 642
(1983) (statement of Professor Joseph L. Peterson).
24
MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14 (2001) (“The
psychological literature distinguishes motivational and cognitive bias.”).
25
The leading article on the subject is D. Michael Risinger et al., The
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12–21 (2002) (describing
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1. Motivational Bias
Motivational bias “is close to the popular notion of bias (the referee is
biased because he wants one side to win).”26 Several notorious examples seem
to fit within this category. For example, Fred Zain, who became infamous
because of his misconduct at the West Virginia state crime laboratory,
routinely reported results that favored the prosecution.27 An investigation by
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation
Board (ASCLD/LAB), found that, “when in doubt, Zain’s findings would
always inculpate the suspect.”28 His replacement as director of serology
described Zain as “very pro-prosecution.”29 Zain was such a treasured witness
that, even after he left the state to accept a position in a San Antonio crime
laboratory, West Virginia prosecutors sent evidence to him for retesting.30 The
prosecutors relied on Zain because the remaining West Virginia serologists
were incapable, in their view, of reaching the “right” results.31
While working at the Oklahoma City Crime Laboratory for nearly twenty
years, Joyce Gilchrist repeatedly overstated test results, withheld evidence, and
provided critical evidence for the prosecution.32 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit criticized Gilchrist for “provid[ing] the jury with evidence
several types of cognitive bias, including observer effects, anchoring effects, role
effects, conformity effects, and experimenter effects).
26
REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 14.
27
Zain falsified test results in as many as 134 cases from 1979 to 1989. See In re
Investigation of the W.Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501,
510–11 (W.Va. 1993). In reviewing a judicial report on Zain’s decade of misconduct,
the West Virginia Supreme Court spoke of “shocking and . . . egregious violations”
and the “corruption of our legal system.” Id. at 508. The judicial inquiry concluded
that “as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by Zain at
any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed invalid, unreliable, and
inadmissible.” Id. at 520; see generally Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and
Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 172–74
(2007) (discussing Zain’s conduct).
28
In re Investigation of W.Va., 438 S.E.2d at 512 n.9.
29
Id. at 514 n.23.
30
His work in Texas also proved troublesome: “In the case of Gilbert Alejandro,
the expert, Fred Zain claimed a DNA match when in fact Zain had never conducted
any testing beyond initial inconclusive testing, and final DNA testing conducted after
the trial excluded Alejandro.” Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 55, 84 n.109 (2008).
31
According to Zain’s replacement, “several prosecutors expressed
dissatisfaction with the reports they were receiving from serology and specifically
requested that the evidence be analyzed by Zain.” In re Investigation of W. Va., 438
S.E.2d at 513 n.16 (referring to deposition of T.S. Smith). “[Serologist] Myers also
testified that after he had been unable to find blood on a murder suspect’s jacket, it was
sent to Texas, where Zain found a bloodstain which tested consistent with the blood of
the victim.” Id. at 512. “[Serologist] Bowles also testified that at least twice after Zain
left the lab, evidence on which Bowles had been unable to obtain genetic markers was
subsequently sent to Texas for testing by Zain, who again was able to identify genetic
markers.” Id.
32
See Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001).
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implicating [a defendant] in the sexual assault of the victim which she knew
was rendered false and misleading by evidence withheld from the defense.”33
As one author commented: “If [Gilchrist] were simply incompetent, her
mistakes would have been all over the map. Instead, her mistakes benefited the
prosecution.”34
2. Cognitive Bias: Role Effects
If the motivation is subconscious, the bias can be classified as a type of
cognitive bias called “role effect” bias.35 In short, people’s perception of their
role can influence their decisions, especially in cases of ambiguity. “Given
what is known about reference group phenomena, the need that people have for
social support of attitudes and conduct, and the process of socialization in
occupational settings, it strains credulity to believe that these experts do not
identify with prosecutors.”36 According to a former laboratory director, “Many
forensic scientists at the state police labs . . . saw their role as members of the
state’s attorney’s team. ‘They thought they were prosecution witnesses[.]’ . . .
‘They didn’t understand they were just scientists.’”37
In 1997, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice issued a report
on the FBI laboratory’s explosives unit.38 This report documented numerous
deficiencies, including inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the competence
of examiners, improperly prepared laboratory reports, insufficient
documentation of test results, inadequate record management and retention,
and failure to resolve serious and credible allegations of incompetence.39 In the
33

Id.; see generally Giannelli, supra note 27, 174–82 (discussing Gilchrist’s
conduct).
34
MARK FUHRMAN, DEATH AND JUSTICE: AN EXPOSE OF OKLAHOMA’S DEATH
ROW MACHINE 223 (2003). Fuhrman also wrote that Gilchrist “appears to have used
her lab tests to confirm the detectives’ hunches rather than seek independent scientific
results. . . . She treated discovery requests with contempt and kept evidence from the
defense. She systematically destroyed evidence at the very time when she knew that
much of that evidence might be retested.” Id. at 232.
35
See Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 18–19.
36
MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 53 (1983).
37
Mills et al., supra note 9 (quoting Don Plautz, a former director in the Illinois
crime lab system); see also Teichroeb, supra note 9 (explaining that crime labs are
often biased in favor of the prosecution).
38
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI
LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED
MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES, Executive Summary, pt. I,
sec. A (1997), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/fbilab1/fbil1toc.htm
[hereinafter 1997 I.G. REPORT].
39
Id.; see also JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE 2
(1998) (concluding that FBI examiners “had given scientifically flawed, inaccurate,
and overstated testimony under oath in court; had altered the lab reports of examiners
to give them a pro-prosecutorial slant, and had failed to document tests and
examinations from which they drew incriminating conclusions, thus ensuring that their
work could never be properly checked”); Bales, supra note 7, at 53 (“[T]he [1997 I.G.
Report] did contain deeply disturbing findings of inadequate procedures, insufficient
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Oklahoma City bombing case, the I.G. Report found that an examiner’s
conclusion about the identity of the explosive charge was “speculation” and
“tilted in such a way as to incriminate the defendants.”40
3. Cognitive Bias: Contextual Bias
Another type of cognitive bias is contextual bias, which occurs when
extraneous information influences a decision, typically in cases of ambiguity.41
When clinical trials for a new drug are conducted, “double blind” procedures
are used—i.e., randomized clinical trials. Neither the patient nor the physician
knows whether the patient is receiving the new drug or a placebo (the control).
Numerous studies have demonstrated that physicians who know that patients
are receiving a new drug tend to see positive results, even when there are
none.42 In short, extraneous knowledge alters our expectations, which in turn
affects our perceptions.43
There is no shortage of examples: “[Professor] Peter DeForest has
described investigators who responded to inconclusive results by saying to
forensic examiners: ‘Would it help if I told you we know he’s the guy who did
it?’”44 One laboratory examiner “said she tried not to be swayed by detectives’
belief that they had a strong suspect. ‘We’re all human,’ she said. ‘I tried not to

supervision, and improper conduct.”); see generally Giannelli, supra note 27, at 195–
96 (discussing the 1997 I.G. Report); David Johnston, F.B.I. Lab Practices Faulted in
Oklahoma Bomb Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at A1 (discussing poor scientific
practices in the investigation of the Oklahoma City bombing).
40
1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 38, at pt. III, sec. F.
41
REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 15 (“It also appears that extraneous information
supporting a hypothesis will affect our judgement of that hypothesis, and of the
evidence for it, even when we know we should not take the extraneous information
into account.”).
42
See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 185
(2d ed. 1986) (“When it is feasible, a double-blind technique is employed. That is,
neither the investigator nor the subject knows until the conclusion of the study who is
in the treatment or control group. The purpose of double-blinding is to overcome
biases on the part of both subjects and investigators . . . .”).
43
Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 45 (“The simplest, most powerful, and most
useful procedure to protect against the distorting effects of unstated assumptions,
collateral information, and improper expectations and motivations is blind testing. An
examiner who has no domain-irrelevant information cannot be influenced by it. An
examiner who does not know what conclusion is hoped for or expected of her cannot
be affected by those considerations.”).
44
See id. at 39. The psychological literature on lineups provides another
illustration. Eyewitnesses with reservations about their identifications often become
positive after learning that the person they identified was the prime suspect in the case.
See REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMM.
TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING
THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 37 (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds.,
2006) (“Ideally, the witness should never be told whether he selected the ‘right man’ so
that his confidence is not artificially inflated by the time of trial.”).
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let it influence me. But I can’t say it never does.’”45 Joyce Gilchrist often
received detectives’ views on suspects before she conducted her
examinations.46 In another case, an FBI examiner identified a substance as
being consistent with an explosive “based in part on the fact that pieces of cut
detonation cord had been found in a garbage can outside the suspect’s
house.”47
4. Cognitive Bias: Confirmation Bias
Another type of cognitive bias known as “confirmation bias” concerns
“the tendency to test a hypothesis by looking for instances that confirm it rather
than by searching for potentially falsifying instances.”48 Confirmation bias
played a role in the FBI’s misidentification of Brandon Mayfield’s fingerprints
in the Madrid terrorist train bombing investigation.49 According to an FBI
review, the “power” of the automated fingerprint correlation “was thought to
have influenced the examiner’s initial judgment and subsequent
examination.”50 Three other experts, one of whom was court-appointed, also
confirmed the initial misidentification.51 These reviews were not conducted
blind—i.e., the reviewer knew that a positive identification had already been
made—and thus were subject to the influence of contextual/confirmation
bias.52

45

Ruth Teichroeb, Rare Look Inside State Crime Labs Reveals Recurring
Problems: 23 Cases in 3 Years Had DNA Test Errors, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
July 22, 2004, at A1 (quoting lab expert Denise Olson).
46
See FUHRMAN, supra note 34, at 91 (“When Cook and other homicide
detectives gave Gilchrist hair samples from a suspect, they would often let her know
that this was the person they wanted to arrest.”).
47
Bales, supra note 7, at 55 (“Of course, where the cord was found was irrelevant
to the scientific examination of the residue on the knife and to the examiner’s
conclusions. . . . Based on recommendations by the OIG, the FBI has instructed its
examiners not to base forensic conclusions on unstated assumptions or information that
is collateral to the examinations performed.”); see also id. at 52 (The 1997 I.G. Report
“concluded that an examiner from the lab’s explosives unit had erred by purporting to
identify the particular explosives used in the [1993] World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City bombings. The error stemmed from the examiner’s reliance on information that
was tied to suspects but not relevant to his scientific analysis.”).
48
Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 7; see also REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 15
(“We tend to look for confirming, rather than disconfirming, evidence; we may judge
evidence of better quality if it agrees with our theory, or worse quality if it does not;
and our beliefs can persevere even after being discredited.”).
49
See Sara Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at A1 (Spanish authorities cleared Brandon Mayfield and
matched the fingerprints to an Algerian national).
50
Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in
the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706, 713 (2004).
51
Id. at 709–11.
52
Id. at 713.
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5. Cognitive Bias: Reconstructive Effects
Another type of cognitive bias involves “reconstructive effects.”53 When
people rely on their memory, they tend to fill in gaps with what they believe
should have occurred. One of the Inspector General’s reports on the FBI
laboratory addressed this issue: “[C]ontemporaneous documentation is
important to ensure that the case file accurately reflects the work performed on
each evidence item that is tested. . . . [S]taff members may be unduly
influenced by protocol requirements when relying on memory, and document
what they know should have occurred when their recollection is vague.”54
6. Research
Although the psychological literature on cognitive bias is well developed,
research in forensic science has lagged.55 One researcher performed a
rudimentary experiment involving handwriting comparisons in 198456 and then
followed up with a study on hair examinations in 1987.57 Although Professor
Jonakait mentioned the topic in a 1991 law review article,58 the issue was thrust
to the forefront when Professor Risinger and his colleagues published an
extensive article on the subject in 2002.59
As a result of the Mayfield case, British researchers devised a covert
experiment to test contextual bias.60 Five fingerprint examiners who were
unfamiliar with the Mayfield prints were asked by colleagues to compare a
crime scene print and suspect print.61 “They were told that the pair of prints
53

Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 15–16 (providing the example of a “forensic
scientist who takes poor notes during an examination and prepares a skimpy report, but
then goes back to ‘spruce them up’ shortly before trial”).
54
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI DNA
LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES 107 (May
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0405/final.pdf.
55
See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter to the Editor, Contaminated
Evidence, 304 SCI. 959, 959 (May 14, 2004) (“[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly
unwilling to confront and control the problem of bias, insisting that it can be overcome
through sheer force of will and good intentions.”).
56
Larry S. Miller, Bias Among Forensic Document Examiners: A Need for
Procedural Change, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407, 410 (1984) (“The conclusions
and opinions reported by the examiners supported the bias hypothesis.”).
57
Larry S. Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human
Hair, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 157, 161 (1987). In the conventional method of hair
examination, the examiner is given hair samples from a known suspect along with a
report including information relating to the guilt of the suspect. In the study on hair
examinations, the findings “raise some concern regarding the amount of unintentional
bias among human hair identification examiners . . . . A preconceived conclusion that a
questioned hair sample and a known hair sample originated from the same individual
may influence the examiner’s opinion when the samples are similar.” Id. at 161.
58
Jonakait, supra note 4, at 160–64.
59
Risinger et al., supra note 25.
60
Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75–76 (2006).
61
Id. at 75.
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was the one that was erroneously matched by the FBI as the Madrid bomber,
thus creating an extraneous context that the prints were a non-match.”62 The
participants were then instructed to ignore this information.63 The prints, in
fact, were not from the Mayfield case; they were from cases that each of the
participants had previously matched.64 Of the five examiners, only one still
judged the print to be a match.65 The other four changed their opinions; three
directly contradicted their prior identifications, and the fourth concluded that
there was insufficient data to reach a definite conclusion.66 “This is striking
given that all five experts had seen the identical fingerprints previously and all
had decided that the prints were a sound and definite match.”67
A follow-up covert study, which also involved experts, showed that
fingerprint examiners could be biased toward a finding of identification if
informed that the suspect confessed or toward a finding of exclusion if told that
the suspect had an alibi.68 Another investigation focused on the effects of
emotions on decision making.69
Because the research in the forensic field is in its nascent stage,70 the NAS
Report recommends further investigation of observer bias and other sources of
62

Id. at 76.
Id.
64
Id. at 75.
65
Id. at 76.
66
Id.
67
Id. The authors of the study concluded the “study shows that it is possible to
alter identification decisions on the same fingerprint, solely by presenting it in a
different context. This does not imply that fingerprint and other forensic identifications
are not a science, but it does highlight problems of subjectivity, interpretation, and
other psychological and cognitive elements that interact and may distort any scientific
inquiries.” Id. at 77.
68
Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 600, 608, 612 (2006); see also Itiel Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Metaanalytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 900 passim (2008) (discussing a meta-analysis of both studies).
Another study concluded that external information had an effect but that its
effects were more pronounced with novices than experts; the latter provided fewer
definitive and erroneous judgments. As the researchers acknowledged, however, the
examiners knew they were being tested. Glenn Langenburg et al., Testing for Potential
Contextual Bias Effects During the Verification Stage of the ACE-V Methodology
When Conducting Fingerprint Comparisons, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 571, 580–81 (2009).
69
Itiel Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual
Top-Down Processing on Matching Fingerprints, 19 APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 799,
806–07 (2005) (“The results of this study demonstrated that emotion and subliminal
messages did influence decision making[,]” but not in clear-cut cases).
70
For discussion of the research, see Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision
in ‘Blind’ Justice: Expert Perception, Judgment and Visual Cognition in Forensic
Pattern Recognition, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 161 (2010); see also Bruce
Budowle et al., A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic
Sciences and Direction for Continuing Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 803
(2009) (arguing that “[c]omplete ignorance to case specific information exhibits poor
judgment and should not be considered”); D.E. Krane et al., Letter to the Editor,
Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA
Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 1006 (2008) (“The interpretation of an
63
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human error in forensic examinations.71 Cognitive bias is most likely a far
greater danger than motivational bias precisely because it is a subconscious
influence.72 Forensic techniques that have a substantial subjective component
should be a special concern—e.g., fingerprint identifications,73 firearms
(ballistics) identifications,74 and handwriting comparisons.75
C. The Prosecutor
Of course, the police are not the only ones who may influence government
experts.76 Prosecutors also have pressured experts to slant their testimony.77
evidentiary DNA profile should not be influenced by information about a suspect’s
DNA profile”).
71
NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24 (Recommendation 5) (“Such programs might
include studies to determine the effects of contextual bias in forensic practice (e.g.,
studies to determine whether and to what extent the results of forensic analyses are
influenced by knowledge regarding the background of the suspect and the
investigator’s theory of the case).”).
72
See REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 14 (“Cognitive biases are potentially more
problematic, for these result from unconscious reasoning strategies that can lead us to
unwarranted conclusions.”); Dror & Cole, supra note 70, at 162 (“Errors committed by
well-intentioned experts are more problematic and dangerous . . . .”); Risinger et al.,
supra note 25, at 11 (finding cognitive bias “far more pervasive but generally
unnoticed” and “a problem in some respects more troublesome and troubling than the
intentional misconduct”).
73
See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 16–17 (Mass. 2005) (“In the
evaluation stage, . . . the examiner relies on his subjective judgment to determine
whether the quality and quantity of those similarities are sufficient to make an
identification, an exclusion, or neither.”); Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.
L. & POL’Y 143, 158 (2005) (“In contrast to the scientifically-based statistical
calculations performed by a forensic scientist in analyzing DNA profile frequencies,
each fingerprint examiner renders an opinion as to the similarity of friction ridge detail
based on his subjective judgment.”).
74
See United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he
Government did not seriously contest the Court’s conclusions that ballistics lacked the
rigor of science and that, whatever else it might be, its methodology was too subjective
to permit opinions to be stated to ‘a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.’”); United
States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 372 (D. Mass. 2006) (“Because an examiner’s
bottom line opinion as to an identification is largely a subjective one, there is no
reliable statistical or scientific methodology which will currently permit the expert to
testify that it is a ‘match’ to an absolute certainty, or to an arbitrary degree of statistical
certainty.”).
75
See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(“Such [overly fine] distinctions are certainly improper in forensic document
examination, where it is conceded that conclusions are drawn, in large part, on
subjective criteria.”).
76
ABA Criminal Justice Standards state that “[a] prosecutor who engages an
expert for an opinion should respect the independence of the expert and should not
seek to dictate the formation of the expert’s opinion on the subject. . . . [T]he
prosecutor should explain to the expert his or her role in the trial as an impartial expert
. . . .” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION 58 (Standard 3-3.3(a)) (3d ed. 1993), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/prosecutionfunction.pdf. A comparable
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For more than a decade, a Texas pathologist worked closely with prosecutors
and police “‘shad[ing] things to follow along with the police theory of the
case.’”78 As the special prosecutor remarked: “If the prosecution theory was
that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then that was what [the
pathologist] reported.”79
In one of Joyce Gilchrist’s cases, an appellate court wrote: “[W]e are
greatly disturbed by the implications that the Oklahoma County District
Attorney’s Office may have placed undue pressure upon Ms. Gilchrist to give a
so-called expert opinion, which was beyond scientific capabilities . . . .”80 In
Troedel v. Wainwright,81 a capital murder case, the court found that a FBI
expert shaped his testimony in a way that was “at the very least, . . .

standard applies to defense counsel. See id. at 188 (Standard 4-4.4(a)). The
commentary to this standard elaborates: “Statements made by physicians, psychiatrists,
and other experts about their experiences as witnesses in criminal cases indicate the
need for circumspection on the part of lawyers who engage experts. Nothing should be
done by a lawyer to cast suspicion on the process of justice by suggesting that the
expert color an opinion to favor the interests of the client the lawyer represents.” Id. at
189.
77
See generally Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics,
and Expert Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1520–27 (2007) (discussing the
problems associated with prosecutors and experts). Experts often are pressured by
attorneys to “push the envelope”—not a surprising occurrence in an adversary system.
See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 31 (“‘Most attorneys . . . like to let you know
what their opinions of the facts of the case are — irrespective of the scientific
conclusions.’”) (quoting Dr. Robert Shaler, former head of N.Y.C. Medical Examiner’s
DNA unit).
78
Roberto Suro, Ripples of a Pathologist’s Misconduct in Graves and Courts of
West Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A22 (quoting Tommy J. Turner, appointed
by a state district judge to investigate Dr. Ralph R. Erdmann). “[A]ll the while [Dr.
Erdmann] worked in close collaboration with many prosecutors and police officials,
some of whom are now prominent in politics.” Id.; see also Roy Bragg, Autopsy
Record of Pathologist Who Quit Raises Many Eyebrows, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1992,
at A1 (Dr. Linda Norton, a former Dallas County assistant medical examiner, stated:
“‘It’s as though there’s some sort of collusion between Dr. Erdmann and the DA.’”).
79
Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil: Discovery of Possibly
Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, 79 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (Mar.
1993) (quoting Tommy J. Turner); see also Chip Brown, Pathologist Accused of
Falsifying Autopsies, Botching Trial Evidence Forensics, L.A. TIMES, April 12, 1992,
at A24 (“[F]ormer Dallas County assistant medical examiner Linda Norton was quoted
as saying Erdmann routinely performs ‘made-to-order autopsies that support a police
version of a story.’”).
80
McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). There, the
court ultimately held that despite these concerns, it “could not conclude . . . that
appellant has established the prosecution’s knowing use of false or misleading
evidence.” Id.; see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 258
(1988) (“The District Court further concluded that one of the prosecutors improperly
argued with an expert witness during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave
testimony adverse to the Government.”).
81
667 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff’d, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987).
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misleading.”82 The expert claimed that the prosecutor had “pushed” him to
enhance his testimony, a claim the prosecutor substantiated.83
Consequently, removing the crime laboratory from police control still
leaves a problem of prosecutorial influence, albeit perhaps lessened.
II. COUNTERARGUMENTS
There are several criticisms of the proposal for establishing independent
laboratories, which are discussed in this Part.
A. Integration with Police Investigative Function
A forensic laboratory may play an important role in the early stages of a
criminal investigation. As two commentators have noted: “Increasing the
laboratory’s geographical or organizational remoteness . . . can limit the
effectiveness of the laboratory’s participation in the investigative phases of a
case, when its scientific input may have the greatest chance of contributing to
justice.”84 This argument raises a serious concern. However, homicide

82
Id. at 1459. The expert’s report of a gunshot residue test concluded that swabs
“from the hands of Troedel and Hawkins contained antimony and barium in amounts
typically found on the hands of a person who has discharged a firearm or has had his
hands in close proximity to a discharging firearm.” Id. at 1458. The expert testified in
accordance with this report at Hawkins’s trial but enhanced his testimony at Troedel’s
trial, where he testified that “Troedel had fired the murder weapon.” Id. In contrast,
during federal habeas proceedings, the same expert testified in a deposition that “he
could not, from the results of his tests, determine or say to a scientific certainty who
had fired the murder weapon” and “the differences in the amount of barium and
antimony on the hands of Troedel and Hawkins were basically insignificant.” Id. at
1459. In granting habeas relief, the court “conclude[d] that the opinion Troedel had
fired the weapon was known by the prosecution not to be based on the results of the
neutron activation analysis tests, or on any scientific certainty or even probability.
Thus, the subject testimony was not only misleading, but also was used by the State
knowing it to be misleading.” Id. at 1459–60.
83
Id. at 1459 (“[A]s Mr. Riley candidly admitted in his deposition, he was
‘pushed’ further in his analysis at Troedel’s trial than at Hawkins’ trial. . . . [A]t the . . .
evidentiary hearing held before this Court, one of the prosecutors testified that, at
Troedel’s trial, after Mr. Riley had rendered his opinion which was contained in his
written report, the prosecutor pushed to ‘see if more could have been gotten out of this
witness.’”).
84
Jan S. Bashinski & Joseph L. Peterson, Forensic Sciences, in LOCAL
GOVERNMENT: POLICE MANAGEMENT 559, 581 (William Geller & Darrel Stephens
eds., 4th ed. 2004). Bashinski and Peterson state: “Remoteness also makes the police
department less able to direct the efforts of the laboratory toward the cases that the
department considers most important . . . .” Id.; see also Bales, supra note 7, at 55
(“[T]he relationship between labs and law enforcement has flourished because of
practical benefits—for example, streamlining tasks such as close and timely
communication, the transfer of evidence, and record-keeping.”); NDAA Statement,
supra note 18 (“We believe that laboratories housed within government agencies and
whose mission is focused on public safety are likely to be more responsive and
accountable to those community needs than those situated otherwise.”).
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detectives work closely with medical examiner officials in death investigations,
and medical examiner offices are typically independent of the police.
B. Practicability
According to a 2005 census, there are now 389 publicly funded crime
laboratories in the United States: 210 state or regional laboratories, eighty-four
county laboratories, sixty-two municipal laboratories, and thirty-three federal
laboratories.85 Some of these laboratories are quite small: “The median staff
size in 2005 was 16.”86 This suggests that some laboratories could probably not
exist as an independent entity.
C. Funding
Because underfunding of crime laboratories in this country is chronic,
resources are always an issue.87 The minority report of the Illinois Capital
Punishment Commission argued that funding for the state laboratory would be
jeopardized if it were separated from the police:
This new agency will have to compete with other, larger agencies for
scarce state resources. Retaining the forensic laboratory system as
part of the Illinois State Police provides an opportunity for achieving
economies of scale and administration, as well as security in funding
and accountability that might not otherwise be available for a much
smaller, stand-alone agency left to fend for itself.88
In contrast, the NAS Report assumed that laboratory independence would
protect a laboratory’s budget. According to the report, law enforcement control
“leads to significant concerns related to the independence of the laboratory and
its budget.”89 Under this view, independence would mean “the forensic science
laboratories would be able to set their own budget priorities and not have to
compete with the parent law enforcement agencies.”90

85

See MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES 8 (2005), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpffcl05.pdf.
86
Id. at 2.
87
See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967) (“[T]he great
majority of police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack
highly skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed
. . . .”); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 304 (1974) (“Too many police crime laboratories have
been set up on budgets that preclude the recruitment of qualified, professional
personnel.”).
88
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMM., supra note 15, at 54.
89
NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 183–84.
90
Id. at 184; see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 257 (“Crime laboratory
budgets should be independent from the police . . . .”).
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Because of the diversity of crime laboratories and their funding structures,
it is almost impossible to predict how funding would be affected if laboratories
became independent.
D. Efficacy of Reform
The minority report of the Illinois Capital Punishment Commission also
argued that an independent laboratory would not solve the problem of police
influence. Because police and prosecutors use crime laboratories far more than
defense attorneys do, the minority believed that close relationships were
inevitable.91 There is some merit in this position. Yet there is a difference
between working with someone, even extensively, and working with someone
who is a superior (or works for a superior) within the same organization.
III. THE NAS PROPOSAL
The NAS Report recommends only that “administrative control” of the
laboratory be removed from law enforcement agencies or prosecutors.92 The
report went on to explain:
Ideally, public forensic science laboratories should be independent of
or autonomous within law enforcement agencies. In these contexts,
the director would have an equal voice with others in the justice
system on matters involving the laboratory and other agencies. The
laboratory also would be able to set its own priorities with respect to
cases, expenditures, and other important issues.93
In other words, the goal is for a laboratory to have sufficient autonomy to
protect the integrity of the laboratory’s findings. As a byproduct of a laboratory
controversy,94 the Virginia legislature in 2005 made the Division of Forensic
Science a separate department under the Secretary of Public Safety.95 The
91

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMM., supra note 15, at 53 (“The reality is that no
matter how ‘independent’ this separate state agency is, the bulk of its work will still be
for police agencies and prosecutors. As is true today for the vast majority of cases, the
forensic experts will be called to testify by the prosecution and these experts will
undoubtedly continue to be subject to cross-examination for that testimonial history.
As a result, an ‘independent’ laboratory will be subject to criticism as a
‘police/prosecutor’ lab even if it is not under the direct control and management of a
police agency, because of the nature of its day to day work.”).
92
NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24 (“Congress should authorize and appropriate
incentive funds . . . for the purpose of removing all public forensic laboratories and
facilities from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’
offices.”).
93
Id. at 184.
94
See Giannelli, supra note 27, at 192–95 (discussing the Earl Washington Jr.
case where a mentally retarded man had been convicted of a rape-murder and spent
seventeen years in prison, only to be pardoned based on DNA evidence that was
erroneously interpreted by experts).
95
VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-1100 (2005) (changing Division of Forensic Science into
the Department of Forensic Science). A Forensic Science Board and Scientific
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laboratory had previously been under the Department of Criminal Justice
Services. Although perhaps not a major change, this reorganization did
increase laboratory autonomy.
The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors proposed a different
approach. That organization recommended that crime laboratories should not
be removed “from parent agencies if the parent agency is required to document
how crime laboratories have scientific autonomy with the freedom to conduct
testing and report results without pressure from [external] activity, interest, or
influence.”96
In sum, the critical issue is for law enforcement and crime laboratories to
acknowledge the problem and then to take steps to insulate the laboratory from
improper influence.
IV. ADDITIONAL MEASURES
The problems raised by the law enforcement-crime laboratory relationship
should also be addressed by the implementation of additional measures,97 many
of which appear as other recommendations in the NAS Report. As one
commentator noted: “To the extent that we are aware of our vulnerability to
bias, we may be able to control it. In fact, a feature of good scientific practice
is the institution of processes—such as blind testing, the use of precise
measurements, standardized procedures, statistical analysis—that control for
bias.”98
First, case files need to document the laboratory analysis. The lack of
bench notes was a significant problem in the laboratory scandals. For example,
the Chicago,99 Houston,100 and FBI explosives unit101 investigations all found
inadequate documentation in forensic case files.102

Advisory Committee were created at the same time. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-1109 &
1111 (2005).
96
An Open Letter from the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors to
Senator Patrick Leahy Regarding the NAS Report, (March 17, 2009), in FORENSIC
MAG. (April/May 2009), available at http://www.forensicmag.com/ articles.asp?pid
=269.
97
See Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 111th Cong., Sept. 9, 2009 (statement of
Matthew Redle, County and Prosecuting Attorney, Sheridan County, Wyoming)
(discussing the importance of implementing quality control measures in laboratories
such as “laboratory accreditation and personnel certification programs . . . ; internal
peer review procedures; maintenance of appropriate testing documentation to facilitate
internal and external peer review of individual case testing; external and internal
performance audits; regular proficiency testing as a check on both personnel and
protocol performance; and corrective action procedures when proficiency testing or
casework errors are discovered”).
98
REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 16 (footnote omitted).
99
Letter from Professor George F. Sensabaugh, University of California at
Berkeley, to Locke E. Bowman, The MacArthur Justice Center, University of Chicago
Law School 5 (Oct. 16, 2003) (on file with author) (“Overall, the documentation of the
lab work as described in the three pages of lab notes is inadequate and incomplete.
Moreover, the formal lab reports describe results of testing for which there is no record
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Second, bench notes should be recorded contemporaneously with the
examination. Otherwise, the examiner is subject to “reconstructive effects.”103
Third, protocols should address contextual bias by shielding examiners
from information that is not germane to the examination.104
Fourth, comprehensive laboratory reports are necessary.105 Currently,
laboratory reports often are “terse to the point of being indecipherable.”106 For
example, some laboratory reports provide only a brief statement of the results:
in the lab notes. In short, the documentation in this case falls short of accepted
scientific standards.”).
100
See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, THIRD REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME LABORATORY AND
PROPERTY ROOM 28 (June 30, 2005) (“Among other problems it identified, the 2002
DPS audit found that no such written procedures [for case notes and lab reports]
existed and identified numerous deficiencies in the documentation contained in the lab
reports.”), available at http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/050630report.pdf.
101
See 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 38 (recommending the preparation of
adequate case files to support reports); Bales, supra note 7, at 57 (noting that one FBI
examiner “testified that he had performed certain tests that were not described in his
notes”).
102
See Law v. State, 307 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. 1983) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“It
is an insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was conducted from which
absolutely no notes or records survive. . . . A basic principle of scientific testing is that
careful records of test procedure and results are to be scrupulously maintained. A
scientific test without an accompanying report of the testing environment, number of
trials, raw results and analyzed data is in reality no test at all.”).
103
See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
104
ABA DNA Standard 16-3.1(a)(v) recommends laboratories “follow
procedures designed to minimize bias when interpreting test results.” ABA DNA
STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 6. Additionally, “[c]ognitive bias (e.g., observer effects)
occurs because people tend to see what they expect to see, and this typically affects
their decisions in cases of ambiguity.” Id. at 67. See also NAS REPORT, supra note 1,
at 26 (Recommendation 8: “Forensic laboratories should establish routine quality
assurance and quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy of forensic analyses
and the work of forensic practitioners. Quality control procedures should be designed
to identify mistakes, fraud, and bias; confirm the continued validity and reliability of
standard operating procedures and protocols; ensure that best practices are being
followed; and correct procedures and protocols that are found to need improvement.”).
105
ABA DNA Standard 16-3.3 recommends the use of comprehensive laboratory
reports. ABA DNA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 7. The Journal of Forensic Sciences,
the official publication of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, published a
symposium on the ethical responsibilities of forensic scientists in 1989. Symposium,
Ethical Conflicts in the Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 717 (1989). One article
discussed a number of laboratory reporting practices, including (1) “preparation of
reports containing minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’
ammunition for cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings without an
interpretation on the assumption that if an interpretation is required it can be provided
from the witness box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a report to trap
an unsuspecting cross-examiner.” Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of
the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989).
Lucas was the Director of the Centre of Forensic Sciences, Ministry of the Solicitor
General, Toronto, Ontario. Id. at 719.
106
Bales, supra note 7, at 56.
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“e.g., ‘The green, brown plant material in item # 1 was identified as
marijuana.’”107 In its recent decision, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,108 the
Supreme Court noted that the report in that case contained
only the bare-bones statement that ‘[t]he substance was found to
contain: Cocaine.’ At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what
tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and
whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or
the use of skills that the analysts may not have possessed.109
Fred Zain,110 Joyce Gilchrist,111 and Pam Fish,112 among others, omitted critical
information from their reports.
Fifth, the reporting of test results should be accompanied by an
explanation of the significance of any finding.113 A recent investigation of
forensic testimony in DNA exoneration cases revealed that some experts gave
misleading testimony by omitting critical information.114

107

NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 186.
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). The Court held that admission of a laboratory
certificate identifying a substance as cocaine, in the absence of an opportunity to crossexamine the analyst, violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2532.
109
Id. at 2537 (citations omitted).
110
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438
S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (stating Zain “fail[ed] to report conflicting results” and
“fail[ed] to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting
results”).
111
Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Ms. Gilchrist thus
provided the jury with evidence implicating Mr. Mitchell in the sexual assault of the
victim which she knew was rendered false and misleading by evidence withheld from
the defense.”); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988)
(“[T]he forensic report was at best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate and misleading.
. . . Gilchrist admitted at trial, however, that she failed to include her conclusion . . . in
the forensic report given to Mr. Wilson. This significant omission, whether intentional
or inadvertent, resulted in a trial by ambush . . . .”) (citations omitted).
112
See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 125 (“Fish’s misleading testimony in the
Willis case, which led to the conviction of an innocent man and allowed a predator to
continue roaming the streets, shows why the state should have turned over all of Fish’s
laboratory notes and data, rather than merely presenting her final report.”).
113
See FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 110–11 (2004)
(“The conclusions in laboratory reports should be expanded to include the limitations
of compositional analysis of bullet lead evidence. . . . Moreover, a section of the
laboratory report translating the technical conclusions into language that a jury could
understand would greatly facilitate the proper use of this evidence in the criminal
justice system.”).
114
See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). The study identified
several different types of invalid testimony: (1) presenting non-probative evidence as
probative, (2) discounting exculpatory evidence, (3) using inaccurate frequencies or
statistics, (4) providing a statistic without support, (5) providing non-numerical
statements without empirical support, and (6) attributing the source of evidence to the
defendant. Id. at 16–20.
108
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Sixth, examiners should be prohibited from testifying beyond the
laboratory report (unless a supplemental report is issued), a requirement that
would protect against overreaching by prosecutors115 and preclude the
opportunity for improper embellishments.
Finally, an enforceable code of ethics should be adopted.116
Enforcement of these procedures can be effectuated through accreditation.
For example, the American Society of Crime Lab Directors/Laboratory
Accreditation Board requires quality assurance programs—i.e., proficiency
testing, technical reviews, audits, and corrective action procedures.117 The NAS
Report recommends mandatory accreditation of laboratories and the
certification of examiners.118
Legal procedures such as full pretrial discovery119 and the availability of
defense experts also are important protections.120 Not only do they serve due
process norms, they also are quality control mechanisms. Laboratory personnel
should understand that the required documentation generated by the
examination will be turned over to the defense and may be reviewed by
defense experts.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement influence over laboratory decisions is a serious problem.
In an ideal world, independent crime laboratories would be the solution. Crime
laboratories, however, have historically developed within police agencies, and

115

See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26 (Recommendation 9 urges the
establishment of “a national code of ethics for all forensic science disciplines and
encourage[s] individual societies to incorporate this national code as part of their
professional code of ethics.”).
117
See ASCLD/LAB BYLAWS 1 (2008), available at http://www.ascldlab.org/about_us/bylaws.html.
118
NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 25 (Recommendation 7: “Laboratory
accreditation and individual certification of forensic science professionals should be
mandatory, and all forensic science professionals should have access to a certification
process.”).
119
See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 145–211 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing shortcomings of criminal discovery).
120
The minority report of the Illinois Capital Punishment Commission believed
that instead of an independent lab, a better solution “would be provided by state
funding for the creation of a permanent cadre of forensic experts available to defense
attorneys for consultation and review of forensic and scientific evidence.” CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT COMM., supra note 15, at 54. “Such a group of permanently retained
experts would provide a ready and consistent resource for information and assistance to
defense attorneys (both privately retained and publicly appointed) about complicated
areas of science that are not usually taught in law schools or easily understood.” Id.;
see generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a
Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004) (discussing the need
to bolster the right to defense experts).
116
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decades of entrenchment make it difficult to remove laboratories completely
from law enforcement control.121
This does not mean, of course, that the status quo should be preserved. If
located within law enforcement agencies, forensic laboratories should be as
autonomous as possible and should be run in accordance with scientific norms,
including procedures to protect against all types of bias. The NAS Report was
not the last messenger. Within months of the report’s release, the Supreme
Court wrote that “[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of
manipulation.”122

121

See Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 43 (“The establishment of freestanding
government forensic laboratories, though occasionally advocated, would require such a
revolution in thinking and organization, and diminish so many established bureaucratic
empires, that it would take a generation of patient lobbying to have a chance of
success.”) (citation omitted).
122
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009) (citing the
NAS Report).

